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NOTES
LIABIiUTY oF MA.NU.%CTURER FOR INJ URIES TO
FROM DEFECTIVE MACHINERY.

THIRD

PIE'soN

The recent case of Statler v. Rayt (125, N. Y. App. Div.
69) is important as bringing defective machinery, in this case
a boiler, within the exception to the rule exempting manufacturers from liability for injuries to third persons arising from
defective articles.2 The exception referred to has been said
to exist in the case of articles "imminently dangerous to life
or health." 3

There has, however, been an almost uniform

'The court also placed its decision on the ground that the boiler was
dangerous to the public.
'Hset v. J. I. Car Macin. Co., r.o Fed. 865.
flust v. J. L Car Machin. Co. (sui
pr), p. 87o.
(28)
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tendency to exclude machinery, and mechanical appliances and
structures from the scope of this exception. Thus while courts
have asserted the liability of manufacturers of drugs,4 weapons 5 and food,' they have denied liability for injuries due to
defects in the following cases-a hook holding a heavy weight
in a drop press,7 a porch,8 a cylinder of a threshing machine
which burst,9 a hoisting rope of an elevator, 0 and a shelf designed as a platform for workingmen."1 Indeed, in an earlier
New York case,1 2 which seems to have been ignored in both
the majority and minority opinions in the recent case under
discussion, injuries resulting from a defective boiler were held
to impose no liability on the manufacturer.
The reason for this arbitrary exclusion of mechanical appliances and machinery from the category of articles "imminently
dangerous to life or health" seems to rest upon a misconception of the case of Wenterbottom v. Wright,13 which is assumed to have negatived the exitsence of any duty on the part
of a manufacturer toward third persons, whereas in fact it
merely held that no action in contract could be maintained by
such third person against the manufacturer. Since that case
involved a defect in a mechanical appliance, i.e., a coach, subsequent courts, misunderstanding that decision, denied the manufacturer's liability in this class of cases, while recognizing a
liability in instances, which though analogous in principle, were
divergent in fact. Investigation seems to show that there existed at common law a principle which required every man to
properly exercise his trade, and subjected him to liability to
third persons who were injured by his failure to fulfill this
duty. Consequently, the liability of a manufacturer of goods
imminently dangerous to life or health, which is now consid'Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397.

'Dixon v. Bell, 5 Maule & Sel. g&
"Bishop v. Weber, 139 Mass. 4M! But contra: Tomlinson v. Armor
Co., 65 AtL 88S.

'McCaffrey v. Mfg. Co., So At. Rep. 6St.
'Curtin v. Sonterset, 140 Pa. 7m
*1!deic v. Kingsland, etc, Mfg.Co., no Mo. 6o.
"Barrett v. Mfg. Co., 31 Super. Ct. N. Y. 545.

'1 Levan v. Jackson, SS Hun, 194.
"Losee v. Clonte, St N. Y. 494.
10 M. & W. log.
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cred an exception to a rule, is really merely a most obvious
application of a common law doctrine.
No doubt the difficulty of applying the standard of "imminent danger to life or health" has contributed to the- exclusion
of manufactured articles from the operation of the exception
under consideration. Many instances would plainly fall within
the ratio of this exception, as for example, a high scaffold;",
others would as clearly fall without, as a table; while still
others would be difficult of classification, as a chair or shelf.
It is submitted, however, that the interests of justice may be
served without too great a sacrifice of judicial convenience if
the following elements be requisite to the fixing of the manufacturer's liability in any given case: (I) That the article be
one which if defective is imminently dangerous to life or health;
(2) that there be shown a failure to use reasonable care in
the manufacture or production of this article; (3) that it be an
article with which the class of persons of whom the plaintiff
is one will naturally come in contact; (4) and that the injury
actually occurs while the article is put to the use for which
it was designed. To these requirements might well perhaps be
added another, (5) that the article be sold by the manufacturers
as a sound and adequate article, thus relieving the manufacturer from liability for injuries arising from "cheap goods," and
holding that in such case the act of the vendee in knowingly
using such inferior article is the proximate cause of the
injury.

THE EVASION OF

.A

COVENANT RUNNING WITH THE LAND BY
INCORPORATION.

In the case of People's Pleasure Park Co., Inc. v. Rohleder,
61 S. W. 794, a bill was filed to enforce a covenant in a deed
which covenant must be taken to be one that ran with the land,
one which was not against public policy and one which was not
an unreasonable restraint on alienation, though this last proposition might be doubtful as applied to this particular covenant
and would make a very interesting subject for discussion, were
opportunity afforded.
The facts show that in I9oo the then owner of this piece
of land containing some hundred acres divided it into several
"Devhs v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470.
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building lots, and sold these lots separately, each one being
sold subject to a covenant that title thereto should never vest
in "a person or persons of African descent" or in "any colored person." There were no covenants as to user, etc. After
a mesne conveyance from the first grantee, in which this covenant was purposely omitted, several of these lots were conveyed to the defendant (who under the pleadings must be
held to have known all along of the covenant) a corporation,
composed exclusively of colored persons, the charter of
which set forth that the corporation was to maintain a pleasure park solely for negroes. The Court very properly said that
the admitted object of the corporation to so use the land could
not be considered, as there was no covenant in the deed as to
user. The Court, however, denied the injunction solely on the
ground that "such a conveyance by no rule of construction vests
the title in a person or persons of African descent." The Court
states three propositions:
(i) Forfeitures are frowned upon in law.
(2) The words of a covenant like this must always be most
strictly construed, and to obtain a forfeiture the defendant
must be brougit beyond all doubt into the class of those subject to its terms.
(3) A corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity entirely idefferent from any single shareholder, or the entire group
of shareholders taken together..
The first of these three is undoubted law. As for the second, it would seem that the word "person" in the covenant
could properly have been construed to include a corporation,
(for many courts under varied circumstances have so construed
it) and thereby the plain and obvious intent of a covenani admittedly binding could have been carried out. The Court's duty
was to construe the covenant fairly, strictly and with due regard
to the purpose and object of the parties. It is submitted that
this could have been accomplished by letting "person" include
a corporation, a construction which has been sanctioned frequently by the courts, and, therefore, could have been adopted.
The Court might have given practical effect to this construction by holding that unless a by-law or the charter of the corporation prevented negroes from holding its stock then it could
not take title to this land.
But though it might have been a possible way out
of the difficulty tht Court pays but little attention to
this point, and rests the case on the third proposition;
i .e., that a corporation is an entity, entirely separate from
any and all of its members. The chief authorities cited by
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the Court are, "Cook on Corporations," Rudolph Sohm's "Institutes of Roman Law," Marshall, C. J., and Judge Denio.
Two of these are text-books and the other two, though men
of the most eminent authority, nevertheless gave their decisions
at a time when that proposition was more firmly established
than it is to-day. The corporation's separate existence as an
entity is admittedly a legal fiction, and is being less and less
resorted to by courts to obtain desired results. In reality, the
title to the land may, at the dissolution of this corporation, be
divided up among its real owners; i. e., the shareholders, and
if so, then what becomes of this covenant? Are the real owners, to be denied title to their property which they own when
composing a corporation, and is a forfeiture either to the State
or to the original grantors, to be made when the corporation
attempts to divide up its assets among their real owners? If
it is admitted that a conveyance to a corporation composed exclusively of colored persons is not a conveyance to colored persons, what rule of law can be invoked to prevent the shareholders from coining into their own on the dissolution of this
legal entity? Either this covenant, which is here granted to be
sound and binding, is rendered of no effect at all by the fact that
a corporation steps in between, or a much more questionable
application of the covenant is made at a time when it is far
more unjust to enforce it; for entirely innocent shareholders
who bought their stock later might suffer, or a white shareholder, supposing such a one to exist, could take title to his
pro rata share of the land, while his colored brother, who paid
just as much for his stock, could not. It would seem as possible and perhaps more desirable to enforce the covenant, if at
all, at a time when it would work less injustice and this would
be when the corporation containing colored shareholders first
attempted to take title.

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTIES.

The right to a jury trial guaranteed by Section 2 of Article
3 of the Federal Constitution, as well as by the 5 th, 6th and
7th Amendments' thereto, has always bcen assumed by the
'As the first ten amendments are purely restraints upon the federal
government (Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 86; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S.
366, 382; Broum v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 174) and Article 3 relates

purely to suits in iederal courts (Eilenbecker v. Plymouth Co., 134 U.
S. 31, 189o) it has been held (Maxwell v. Doe, 176 U. S. 58z) there is
no objection to trying felonies against state laws in a state court by a
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courts to be the common law jury of twelve ;2 at least such,
it was said, must be the number of jurors at the beginning
of the case. In Thompson v. Utah3 the Supreme Court of
the United States decided that one indicted for a felony could
not consent to be tried by less than twelve jurors, and any such
waiver of his right was invalid. In the case of civil suits this
right to a jury of twelve may be waived.4 The case of pctty misdemeanors was raised in Shick v. U. S.5 There the defendant
was fined $5o by the lower court for selling oleomargarine not
stamped as required by the Act of Congress,' after waiver by
the defendant of his right to be tried by jury. The Court!
held that such a "petty offense" was not a "crime" within the
meaning of Sec. 2 of Article III of the Constitution, and
affirmed the conviction. The Court distinctly differentiated
such an offense from a misdemeanor of a more serious character, such as would be punished by imprisonment, resting
their opinion largely on Blackstone's statement that the word
"crimes" technically includes both felonies and misdemeanors,
yet "in common usage the word "crimes is made to denote such
offenses as are of a deeper and more atrocious dye; while
smaller faults and omissions of less consequence are comprised
under the gentler name of "misdemeanors only," the Constitutional Convention having by unanimous vote amended the
words "the trial of all criminal offenses" in Sec 2 of Article 3
to read "the tial of all crimes."

jury of less than twelve, if such is provided for by the state constitution (the statute in Utah provided for a trial of felonies by a
jury of 8).
'Thompson v. Utah, 70 U. S. 343 (8).

Supra.

'Parsons v. Armor, 3 Pet. 413; U. S. v. Rathbone, 2 Paine, (U. S.)
578. (A similar view has been taken by the state courts concerning
similar provisions in the state constitutions: Huron v. Carter,5 S. Dak.
4; Cravins v. Grant, 4 T. B. Monroe, 126; Roach v. Blakey, 89 Va. 767;
Krenchi v. Dehler, 50 11. 176.) The phraseology of the 7th Amendment is, "The right of trial by jury," &c., hence it is not mandatory so
as to be incapable of waiver by the defendant. Similarly the word
"right" is used in reference to the privileges guaranteed by the 6th
Amendment in criminal cases. On the contrary, Sec. 2 of Article 3 and
the 5th Amendment are unqualifiedly mandatory.
I 195 U. S. 65 (1904).
"Oleomargarine Act of x886 (24 St. 209) as amended by Act of 1902
(32 St. 93).

1Harlan, J. dissenting.
$Commentaries, vol. 4, page 5.
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In the recent case of Dickinson v. U. S.9 the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fir-t Circuit held that a cashier of a national
bank indicted for "the unlawful conversion of certain moneys,
funds and credits," a nisdemeanor under Sec. 52o9 Revised
Statutes, could not consent to be tried by less than twelve
jurors. The case started with a jury of the requisite numbertwelve; two of the jurors were, however, excused b ,the Court
for cause (illness and death in the family) during the trial.
The defendant in writing agreed to the discharge of the jurors
and the continuance of the case, and then on appeal alleged
that the trial was on this account unconstitutional since there
was no trial by a common law jury. The majority of the
court 0 agreed with the contention of the defendant and set
aside the judgment. The Court distinguished between the provisions of the Constitution as originally adopted and the first
ten amendments, holding that the latter were merely a Bill of
Rights, and as such intended purely for the protection of the
person to be benefited thereby, and hence, as he alone was
concerned in their enforcement, they could be waived, while
the former generally was intended to establish a form of
governnient, and as such the entire public had an indirect
interest in its enforcement, and hence it could not be waived,
since to do this would be to allow any defendant to change
the form of government in the constitution of the courts at
his will. Just as no defendant in a criminal suit could agree
to have his case tried by Congress, so he could not agree to
be tried by less than twelve jurors, since either is a change in
the constitution of the tribunal which the people of the United
States have provided for the trial of such offenses as the one
best suited to subserve the public interests."' And this is true
though, says the Court 2 at least in the case of misdemeanors,
he can waive the right to compulsory process for witnesses,
the right to the assistance of counsel in his defense, the right
to be confronted by witnesses13 and the like-privileges secured
Fed. Soi (decided Feb.
Aldrich, J., dissenting.

t159
'

I

z2,

i9o8).

The proceeding is "in inviftm against the will of the defendant"

and he is not in a position "to change the constitution of the court and
jury by which he is to be tried" (Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 35). "He
has no power to consent to the creation of a new tribunal unknown to

the law to try his offense" (St. v. MIansfield, 41 Mo. 470).
At page 8o6.
See Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, (7th edition) page 44z,
note t, and page 452. See also note i (supra).
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to him purely through the Sixth Amendment, and hence
intended merely as a personal protection and not going to the
constitution of the Court."
The question of waiver in the case of a serious misdemeanor
has never conic before the Supreme Court of the United States,
and the English cases never seem to have decided the point,
though they contain some conflicting dicta.15 The cases in the
States where the right of waiver of a jury of twelve was
denied have been mostly cases of felonies,"0 though the ratio
decidendi is usually broad enough to cover either the case of
felonies or misdemeanors. The great majority of the State
cases where the question of Dickinson v. U. S. 9 has actually
arisen have decided that the waiver was valid1".

TiHE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COMMODITIES CLAUSE OF
THE HEPBURN AcT.
On September io, r9o8, the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in United
States v. The Coal Roads, decided, that the Commodities Clause
of the Hepburn Act was invalid, because "in the opinion of this
Court, the enactment in question is not a regulation of commerce within the proper meaning of those words as used in
the Commerce Clause of the Constitutien, and therefore not
within the power granted by that clause ;" and secondly, because

it violated the Fifth Amendment.

A comparison of this case

"In Teenan v. Oklahoma, i9o U. S. 343 (murder), the Supreme
Court held that the right to object to the disqualification of a juror discovered after the taking of evidence had begun may be waived. But
see Hill v. People, (supra), (murder), contra.

"Cf. Forsyth's History of Trial by Jury, 24r; Lord Dacre's Case,

Kelyng's Reports, 56.
"Hill v. People, (supra) ;'ilson v. St., 16 Ark. 6or; St. v. Mansfield, (supra). See also Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (7th ed.),
page 458 and -cases cited in note z on that page.
UComm. v. Dailey, 12 Cush. o (per Shaw, C. J.); C. v. Sweet, z6
Pa. C. C. 198; 4 Dist. 136 (false pretences); St. v. Borowski, ii Nev.
i I9 (misdemeanor in office); St. v. Cox 8 Ark. 436 (assault and battery) ; Murphy v. Comm., I Mete. (Ky.5 365 (betting at an election).
The defendant was fined $oo and the court adverts to the petty character of th- offense in arriving at their decision.
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with the Northern Securities: decision is very interesting. In
each there was a corporation owning two properties-in one, a
controlling interest in the shtares of two competing railroads;
in the other, a railroad and a coal property. The wrong to be
prevented in one was restraint of trade; in the other, discrimination. In neither, did duality of ownership of necessity, nor
actually, but only possibly cause the wrong to be prevented. In
both duality of ownership was authorized by State law. In the
Coal Roads case the Court said, that the Commodities Clause
forced upon the Coal Roads the alternative of either selling, or
of retaining and not using. In the Northern Securities case,
not even the benefit of such an alternative was given. At
common law there is no right to make a contract in restraint of
trade, nor to enter into a combination for that purpose. Nor is
there any right at common law for a common carrier to discriminate.-A private carrier, whether a "farmer" or a corporation, is under no duty at common law to treat all alike; and any
law compelling either so to do would interfere with the right of
contract.-To deny the right to do either, viz., to cause a
restraint of trade or to discriminate, is merely re-enforcing the
common law; and is not in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Every such enactment, of necessity, is bound to cause some
indirect loss.
The power of Congress under the Commerce Clause to enact
the Commodities Act was denied on the ground that it amounted
to a prohibition; and that the power to regulate did not include
the power to prohibit. To determine whether there was, in fact,
a prohibition, it is necessary to consider the substance and not
the form; to consider the actual state of affairs, in order to see
if transportation was, in fact, prohibited. In contemplation of
law a corporation is an entity, distinct and apart from its inembers. Actually, the stockholders are the corporation, and the
co-owners of the two properties in both of the two cases in
question. A group of men, owning two properties, associated
in corporate form in order to embark and operate them in one
business enterprise. In the Northern Securities case, it was
held that to do this, made restraint of trade a possibility; in the
Coal Roads case, it made discrimination a possibility. In
neither case were the stockholders actually compelled to sell
either one of their properties. By neither act were they prevented from operating both of their properties separately. All
that was prohibited by either statute was the continuing to
1 193 U. S. 359 (1903).
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operate the two properties together. Duality of operation, not
of ownership, was forbidden. Viewed in the above light, it can
hardly be said, that the Coal Roads were forced either to sell,
or to retain and not use. "All that is necessary is to distribute
to the stockholders pro rata the shares of a new corporation;
formed to take over the mining and .manufacturing business of
the corporation." 2 The decrease in the value of the shares in
the old corporation would be commensurate to the value of the
shares in the new. The only loss incurred would be due to the
inability to continue to operate the two properties togethercertainly, an indirect taking of property. Corporate organization would require a formal alienation from the old corporation
to the new. But to contend that there was an actual sale, or
even an actual alienation from one group of men to another,
would be impossible. If the actual state of affairs is taken, it
is hard to see that there was any prohibition of the transportation of any commodity; and it is unnecessary to decide whether
such is within the power of the Commerce Clause. The power
to prevent discrimination and restraints upon trade has never
been questioned. If the power to regulate commerce includes
the power to prevent possible restraints upon trade, there is no
reason why it should not include the power to prevent possible
discriminations.
But it must not be overlooked, that the so-called duality of
ownership was subsequent to the enactment of the Anti-Trust
Act in the Northern Securities case, while it was prior to the
enactment of the Hepburn Act in the Coal Roads case. This
affects the question of "due process of law." , It must also be
remembered, that in the former case the rights of no third
parties, who owned shares in corporations in which the offending company was "indirectly" interested by a like ownership of
shares in the same corporation, were affected. It may prove to
be a defect in the drafting of the Hepburn Act that such rights
of third parties may be jeopardized.
'See article by Dr. William Draper Lewis-"Constitutional Questions Involved in the Commodity Clause of the Hepburn Act"-in the
Harvard Law Review, Vol. XXI (r9o8), page 595, at page 613.

